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Abstract
In this paper, we address empirically the trade-offs involved in choosing between
bureaucrats and politicians. In order to do this, we need to map institutions of selection
and retention of public officials to the type of public officials they induce. We do this by
specifying a collective decision-making model, and exploiting its equilibrium information
to obtain estimates of the unobservable types. We focus on criminal decisions across US
states’ Supreme Courts. We find that justices that are shielded from voters’ influence
(“bureaucrats”) on average (i) have better information, (ii) are more likely to change their
preconceived opinions about a case, and (iii) are more effective (make less mistakes) than
their elected counterparts (“politicians”). We evaluate how performance would change if
the courts replaced majority rule with unanimity rule.
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1 Introduction
The basic principle of representative democracy dictates that all legislative and top exec-
utive positions in public office are to be occupied by elected representatives (politicians).
But besides this broad guiding principle, the idea of representation in the operation of
government is much more muddled. In all modern democracies, a number of public posi-
tions of great influence are held by non-elected officials (bureaucrats). Examples for the
US include the Supreme Court, the Federal Reserve Board, and federal agencies.
The different methods of selection and retention of public officials induce differences
in the performance of government. Working well, elections may induce public officials to
act in the public interest, even when their preferences are not aligned with those of the
public. This is the disciplining role of elections emphasized by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn
(1986). Working badly, elections can also induce an official who has more information
than the public to pander to the public, choosing not the appropriate action, but instead
the most popular action (Maskin and Tirole (2004), Canes-Wrone and Shotts (2007)).
Elections can also induce officials to divert resources away from developing expertise
(Alesina and Tabellini (2007)).
Given these various competing effects, it is ultimately an empirical question how
politicians and bureaucrats differ in type and performance. First, there are selection
effects: do voters select different types of public officials – more or less biased, better or
worst at gathering and processing information –than government officials? Second, there
are incentive effects: do reelection induce public officials to improve their proficiency to
deal with the flow of information of each decision? Do they induce them to be more
responsive to the public? Third, differences in type affect performance: are bureaucrats
more effective than politicians?
∗We thank Yosh Halberstam, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Matt Spitzer, and participants in seminars at
NYU, Northwestern-Kellogg, and UC Davis for useful comments to a previous version of this paper.
†Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California
91125, USA, emails: miaryc@hss.caltech.edu, gdl@caltech.edu, and mshum@caltech.edu.
In this paper, we tackle these questions. We build on the foundations laid by a large
literature, which provides overwhelming evidence that bureaucrats and politicians pro-
duce different public policy outcomes. Here we extend this research line to the next step.
Our starting premise is that in order to understand the trade-offs inherent in choosing
between bureaucrats and politicians, we need to map institutions to the type of public
officials they induce. The difficulty, of course, is that this type is unobservable. The con-
tribution of this paper is to bridge this gap. We do this by specifying a decision-making
model, and using equilibrium information to recover the unobservable types. The main
idea is to exploit the information contained in the joint observation of the individual
decisions of members of committees that deal with issues involving both ideological con-
siderations and common values. The underlying common value induces correlation in
votes in equilibrium, which allows us to disentangle bias and quality of information.
We focus here on criminal decisions in US states’ Supreme Courts. The application
suits the approach perfectly for two reasons. First, selection and retention methods
vary across states: while in some states supreme court justices are elected, in others
they are appointed by elected officials. Moreover, non-elected justices are appointed for
life in some states, but must face a political reappointment or an up-or-down retention
election by voters in other states. Second, as other high courts, state supreme courts
are committees making decisions on issues in which there is an underlying common value
component; a correct decision under the law.1 This is particularly transparent in criminal
cases, in which the relevant uncertainty falls more heavily on the specifics of the case
than on the interpretation of the law in a given situation.
Incorporating elements of common values does not mean ruling out disagreement.
The decision of the court will typically balance the members’ goal of reaching a correct
decision, with conflict among them in terms of what is the correct decision in each
case. This conflict arises naturally in the relatively complex cases considered by the high
courts because of differences in the information processed by each justice, because of
differences in their ability to produce and evaluate case-specific information, and because
of idiosyncratic biases in how justices approach different cases.2
In the model, we assume that the goal of any justice i in any given case t is to
rule according to i’s own best understanding of how the law applies to the particulars
of the case. Specifically, we assume that in each case t, a justice’s understanding of
the particulars of the case is summarized by a private signal, with precision θit. The
1Decision-making in the court is different than in a legislature. Judging entails understanding the
body of the law and the details of the case under consideration in order to interpret the meaning of the
law as it applies to the case. As Supreme Court Justice Ruth Ginsburg put it, “[E]ach case is based on
particular facts and its decision should turn on those facts and the governing law, stated and explained
in light of the particular arguments the parties or their representatives choose to present.” (From the
statement submitted to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary by Justice Ruth Ginsburg.) This is also
emphasized by Cameron and Kornhauser (2008), among others.
2Justices’ biases can, but do not necessarily reflect ideological considerations. These preconceptions
about how the law maps to the particulars of each case can also reflect ingrained theoretical arguments
about the law, personal experiences, and other determinants for a non-neutral approach to this case.
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imprecision of the signal leaves room for interpretation, which in turn allows ideological
biases to come into play. This bias boils down to a threshold piit such that the justice
prefers to rule for the Plaintiff in case t if and only if the probability that the law favors
the Plaintiff is at least piit. Information precision and bias then interact to produce
outcomes. Higher precision means that it is typically more clear for the justice whether
the ruling should favor the Plaintiff or the Defendant according to the body of law. A
larger bias means that despite her case information, a justice persists in going with her
preconception of how to rule in a case like this. In the extreme, with piit ≈ 0 (or piit ≈ 1),
justice i will vote almost completely in line with her ideology. On the other hand, when
piit = 1/2 for all i, justices are ideologically unbiased, and vote solely based on their
information.
In the estimation, we recover the values of (θit, piit)|Xt for each justice i conditioning
on observable characteristics of the cases and the justices, including experience variables
(prior judicial and political experience, experience in the state supreme court), context
variables (measures of the political preferences of voters and politicians at the time of
appointment and at the time of decision), and institutional variables (whether the justice
was elected, appointed for an original term subject to a political reappointment or a
retention election, or appointed for life). We do this for two variants of the model:
the expressive voting model (where justices care about getting their decision right), and
the strategic voting model (Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1997, 1998)), where justices are concerned about getting the court’s decision right, and
therefore “learn” from their peers in equilibrium.3 We also estimate justices’ common
prior belief ρ that the law favors the Plaintiff given case characteristics X. This also
captures inherent differences across states in the types of cases heard by the state supreme
courts.
The main results clarify the trade-offs inherent in choosing between bureaucrats and
politicians. First, justices that are shielded from voters’ evaluations (“bureaucrats”) on
average have higher quality of information than justices that face either reelection or
retention elections (“politicians”). In fact, the quality of information of justices that
are shielded from voters’ influence is on average 25% larger than that of justices facing
retention elections, and 30% larger than that of justices that are elected. Institutions of
selection and retention of justices also affect justices’ bias (justices that are not shielded
from voters are more moderate on average), but this effect is more modest in magnitude.
These two components of justices’ type – quality and bias – affect how the justices’
information is reflected in their voting behavior. We find that justices who are shielded
from voters not only have better information, but are also more likely than elected justices
to change their preconceived opinions about a case. We quantify the flexibility of a judge
to incorporate case-specific information with the FLEX measure introduced in Iaryczower
and Shum (2009). This is the probability that a judge votes differently than what she
would have voted for in the absence of case-specific information. We show that the
3In the law and economics literature, this distinction is referred to as whether judges are consequen-
tialist or non-consequentialist (see Cameron and Kornhauser (2008)).
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average FLEX score for elected justices (36%) is lower than that of justices appointed
for life (41%).
Our estimation and modeling approach also allows us to assess directly the effect of
institutions on the performance of the court, as measured by the probability that the
court reaches an incorrect decision. While these error rates are small overall, we find
that justices appointed for life and appointed justices with a political reappointment
on average have a lower probability of reaching an incorrect decision (0.1%) than both
justices that face retention elections (0.4%), and justices that are elected (0.9%).
While state supreme courts typically have a relatively low total error rate, the pattern
of mistakes is highly asymmetric. At both the individual level and at the court level, on
average justices make comparatively large mistakes in favor of the Plaintiff.4 This begs
the question as to how the effectiveness of the courts would change if simple majority
rule (the voting rule currently in use) were replaced by a decision-making rule that tilts
the balance in favor of the Defendant. In particular, we consider a change to a unanimity
rule in which ruling against the Defendant requires the consent of all justices.
In both the strategic and the expressive voting model, introducing the change to una-
nimity rule would have major consequences for public outcomes and the effectiveness of
the courts. In the expressive voting model, where justices care about their vote only,
replacing majority rule by unanimity rule does achieve the purpose of reducing the prob-
ability of an incorrect court decision in favor of the Plaintiff, but only by dramatically
increasing the probability of an incorrect court decision in favor of the Defendant (reach-
ing 33% for elected justices and 35% for non-elected justices facing retention elections).
The strategic voting model predicts large changes in the opposite direction. As a result
of the move to unanimity, strategic justices who care about the decision of the court
would modify their strategy in equilibrium, becoming harsher against the Defendant. As
a result, the move to unanimity would significantly increase the probability of a mistaken
decision against the Defendant (reaching 21% for elected justices).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a literature review.
Section 3 introduces the theoretical model of collective decision-making in the court
and characterizes equilibrium outcomes. Section 4 describes the estimation procedure.
Section 5 presents the main results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The theoretical literature on bureaucrats and politicians builds on the seminal contribu-
tions of Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986), which provide the foundations of the theory
of elections as disciplining device. Barro (1973) introduces the main idea that voters can
4To compare this with the ex ante probability of an incorrect decision, the probability of a mistake
favoring the Plaintiff when the Defendant should win is 0.3% for justices that are isolated from voters,
1.1% for justices facing retention elections and 2.6% for justices facing competitive reelections.
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limit (but not eliminate) rent extraction by elected politicians by making their reelec-
tion conditional on observed behavior. The optimal rule limits rents as much as possible,
while still making it attractive for the politician to want to get reelected. Ferejohn (1986)
formalizes a similar idea within a moral-hazard framework (voters’ payoffs depend on the
– unobservable, costly – effort exerted by the politician), and derives the optimal retro-
spective voting rule. Banks and Sundaram (1998) study the optimal retention rule for
voters in a model that incorporates both moral hazard and adverse selection. Canes-
Wrone, Herron, and Shotts (2001) consider a model in which elected officials have the
same preferences as the electorate, and the incumbent attempts to signal talent (e.g.,
more precise information). They conclude that elected officials will pander (choose the
popular, ex ante preferred action) only under some limited conditions. Canes-Wrone and
Shotts (2007), however, show that elected officials will be more inclined to pander when
there is uncertainty regarding their congruence with the electorate.
Maskin and Tirole (2004) and Alesina and Tabellini (2007, 2008) explicitly compare
bureaucrats and politicians. Maskin and Tirole (2004) introduce a lack of congruence
between voters and public officials. It is assumed that the official values office per se,
and also has a legacy motivation. When the office-holding motive is strong, politicians
want to pander, but when the office motivation is weak, they are guided by the legacy
motivation. Maskin and Tirole (2004) conclude that non-elected officials (bureaucrats,
or “judges”) are preferred when the public is poorly informed about what the optimal
action is, and when feedback about the quality of the decision is limited. Alesina and
Tabellini (2007) models career concerns of bureaucrats (appointed officials) and politi-
cians (elected representatives). Politicians want to win elections to retain their seats,
and thus have to be perceived as having a higher ability than the replacement candidate
from the pool. Bureaucrats are motivated by career concerns: they want to increase their
perceived ability, to improve as much as possible their external professional prospects. As
in Ferejohn (1986), or Banks and Sundaram (1998), effort is unobservable, and interacts
with ability (additively) to produce outcomes. Alesina and Tabellini (2007) conclude
that bureaucrats are preferred in technical tasks for which ability is more important than
effort, or when there is large uncertainty about whether the policymaker has the required
abilities to fulfill her task.
A key common element in these theoretical approaches is that the type of government
official is unknown. The key factor driving the results is the amount of information that
is revealed in different institutional settings about unobservable characteristics of public
officials (their preferences, their competence, or the readiness to exert effort). To the
best of our knowledge, this key feature has not been incorporated into applied research
on the topic. There is, however, a wealth of empirical research motivated by the same
underlying questions that inspired the theoretical literature.
First, a number of papers show that elected and appointed government officials do
in fact behave differently. This, in particular, is the case of elected and appointed reg-
ulators (see Besley and Case (2003) for a survey) and elected and appointed judges in
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the US states.5 Hanssen (2000) shows that states with elected judges have significantly
smaller bureaucracies. He interprets this as evidence that elected judges are more inde-
pendent. Hanssen (2004) shows that institutions that diminish the ability of politicians
to determine whether a judge remains in office are associated with closer competition
between political parties, and with larger differences in party platforms, while the least
independence-enhancing institutions are associated with a stronger single party control.
Besley and Payne (2005) show that states that appoint their judges have lower levels of
discrimination charges compared to those that use some form of election. Gordon and
Huber (2007) analyze the sentencing behavior of district court judges that are elected
and appointed (facing a subsequent retention election) in the state of Kansas. They show
that close to the elections, elected judges are harsher in sentencing relative to appointed
judges.6
Choi, Gulati, and Posner (forthcoming) also focus on state Supreme Court judges,
and shares our emphasis on measuring the effects of the judicial selection process on
non-ideological characteristics of the judges. Their methodology is quite different, as
they focus on opinions instead of voting, and directly find observable proxies of judges’
qualities, including the number of opinions written, and the number of times a judge’s
opinions were cited by other courts at the same level of the judicial hierarchy. In contrast,
we focus on the individual votes to decide the position of the court, and consider a
structural equilibrium model of voting which allows us to “back out” estimates of judges’
bias and quality of information as a function of the judicial selection mechanism.7 Also
taking a more structural approach is Lim (2008), who estimates a structural model
that fully incorporates career concerns into judges’ behavior, using sentencing data from
Kansas.8 With this she shows that the sentencing behavior of elected judges is in fact
an important determinant of their reelection.9 She also shows that while the sentencing
behavior of appointed judges does not vary much with the political orientation of the
district, elected justices tend to be more lenient in liberal leaning districts.
Lim’s model is a purely ideological model, which precludes the possibility of common
values and dispersed information which seem central to the nature of decision-making in
the court. This is a common feature of the empirical literature on voting in committees
thus far, as the theory of voting with common value elements and dispersed information
was developed fairly recently, following the seminal contributions of Austen-Smith and
5Relatedly, Besley and Reynal-Querol (2010) study whether democracies select higher-quality (more
educated) leaders relative to autocracies, using a unique cross-country data spanning the last two cen-
turies.
6More broadly, there is overwhelming evidence showing that judges are sensitive to the political
environment. See Brace and Hall (1990, 1993, 1997) for US states, Gely and Spiller (1990); Spiller and
Gely (1992) for the US Supreme Court, Helmke (2002) and Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tommasi (2002,
2006) for the Supreme Court in Argentina, along many others.
7Choi, Gulati, and Posner (forthcoming) conclude that appointed judges write higher quality opinions
than elected judges do, but elected judges write more opinions.
8See Diermeier, Keane, and Merlo (2005) for a similar approach in Congress.
9Note that this is a surprising finding, given that according to the previous literature, voters are very
uninformed about judges’ decisions in the vast majority of cases (see Gordon and Huber (2007) and
references within, and Bonneau and Hall (2006) and references within).
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Banks (1996), and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997, 1998).10 In this paper we follow
the approach that we introduced in Iaryczower and Shum (2009) to deal with ideology
and common values in the context of equilibrium behavior (for a connected approach, see
Iaryczower, Katz, and Saiegh (2009)).11 Our model of collective decision-making is close
to that of Duggan and Martinelli (2001), although here players’ preferences are public
information.
An interesting issue in connection to strategic voting in this setting is the possible im-
pact of pre-vote deliberation on outcomes. The main question is whether strategic agents
will use pre-vote deliberation to communicate information to their peers, or whether they
will use these arguments to try to influence their opinion, possibly not revealing some
information that can be harmful to their case, or exaggerating evidence one way or the
other. While the incentive to do so is small when interests are well aligned (Coughlan
(2000)), this is not the case when there is (interim) disagreement, as in the setting con-
sider here. This makes truthful revelation of information more difficult, as is illustrated
in the analysis of Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2005, 2006) (see also Li, Rosen, and
Suen (2001) and Doraszelski, Gerardi, and Squintani (2003)).12 Visser and Swank (2007)
consider pre-vote deliberation when committee members want to signal their ability to
a principal. Reputation concerns here induce committee members to misrepresent their
information in deliberations but, in spite of this, they always vote unanimously. This is
because in this setting, disagreement signals lack of competence.Visser and Swank’s basic
logic – that information is reflected in the variation of the justices’ votes – also underlies
the identification of the key model parameters from the observed vote data (see Section
4). However, in our setting votes provide information about not only justices’ ability
(quality of information), but also their bias.
3 A Model of Decision-Making in the Court
In this section, we describe the model of collective decision-making in the courts. In doing
so, we take the parameters of the problem as given, and their dependence on publicly
10For structural estimation of ideological models of voting in committees (that do not directly incor-
porate career concerns) see Poole and Rosenthal (1985, 1991), Heckman and Snyder (1997), Londregan
(1999), Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004) – for the US Congress– and Martin and Quinn (2002, 2007)
– for the US Supreme Court. Degan and Merlo (2008) and de Paula and Merlo (2009) consider the
nonparametric identification and estimation of the ideological voting model. Coate and Conlin (2004),
Coate, Conlin, and Moro (2008), and Kawai and Watanabe (2009) also perform structural estimation of
strategic voting (ie. “pivotal voting”) models with ideological voters.
11With common values and dispersed information, strategic considerations – which are absent in the
sincere voting spatial model – come into play. Our methodology deals with these strategic considerations.
Londregan (1999), Clinton and Meirowitz (2003) and Clinton and Meirowitz (2004), who analyze the
spatial voting model without assuming sincere voting, paying attention to agendas and sequence.
12If agents send not only relevant information, but also other (random) messages, which the group
uses to define correlated voting strategies, more can be done. Gerardi and Yariv (2007) show that every
outcome that can be implemented with a non-unanimous voting rule r can also be implemented (as a
sequential equilibrium of a cheap talk extension of the voting game) with a non-unanimous rule r′. This
obviously enlarges the set of possible equilibrium outcomes for each given voting rule.
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observable characteristics of the choice situation as understood. We make this relation
explicit in Section 4.
The court is composed of n justices, i = 1, . . . , n, who consider T independent cases,
t = 1, . . . , T . In each case t, justice i can rule in favor or against the Defendant. We
denote this ruling by vti ∈ {0, 1}, with vti = 0 indicating a ruling in favor of the Defendant
and vti = 1 a ruling in favor of the Plaintiff. The court aggregates the decisions of the
individual justices by simple majority rule; i.e. rules in favor of the Plaintiff (vt = p) if∑
i v
t
i ≥ Rs ≡ n+12 and in favor of the Defendant (vt = d) otherwise.
We consider two related models of individual behavior. In the expressive voting
model, we assume that in deciding their vote, justices care only about their individual
vote. In the strategic or outcome-oriented voting model, we assume instead that justices
care about the ruling of the court. We assume that the goal of any justice i in any
given case t is that she (in the expressive voting model) or the court (in the strategic
voting model) rules according to i’s own best understanding of how the law applies to
the particulars of the case.
Specifically, before ruling in each case t, each justice i observes a private signal sit =
ωt + σitεit, where εit ∼ N (0, 1). Here ωt ∈ {0, 1} in an unobservable variable – for
both the econometrician and the justices – indicating whether the meaning of the law
favors the Plaintiff (ωt = 1) or the Defendant (ωt = 0), and θit = 1/σit is a scale
parameter that parametrizes the informativeness of i’s signals.13 This parameterization
of the information structure satisfies the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP),
which is important in what follows.
Justices care about this information because their payoffs are state dependent. In
particular, we assume that given piit ∈ (0, 1), justice i has a payoff of −piit when the
law favors the Defendant but she/the court rules in favor of the Plaintiff (vt = 1 when
ωt = 0) and of −(1 − piit) when the law favors the Plaintiff but instead she/the court
rules in favor of the Defendant (vt = 0 when ωt = 1).
14 The payoffs of vt = ωt = 0
and vt = ωt = 1 are normalized to zero. Thus given information E, Justice i votes to
rule against the Defendant in t if and only if Pri(ωt = 1|E) ≥ piit. Equivalently, justice
i votes to rule against the Defendant in case t given E if and only if the likelihood
ratio Pri(E|ωt = 1)/Pri(E|ωt = 0) is larger than piit1−piit
1−ρt
ρt
, where ρt ≡ Pr(ωt = 1)
denotes justices’ common prior probability of the unobserved state ωt. Note that since
ωt is assumed to be unobservable, there is always information that would make any two
justices disagree about a case. Moreover, if sufficiently biased, two justices can disagree
almost always. In particular, with piit ≈ 0 (or piit ≈ 1), justice i is almost always
13We write θit and not simply θi, invariant in t, because in the estimation we will allow the precision
of information to depend on characteristics of the case. With identical observable characteristics across
cases we would have θit = θi for all t. The same remark applies to the bias piit below.
14Thus, pii 6= 1/2 reflects a bias towards the Plaintiff or the Defendant. These preconceptions about
how the law maps to the particulars of each case can reflect a variety of factors inducing a non-neutral
approach to this case, such as ingrained theoretical arguments about the law, personal experiences, or
ideological considerations.
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ideological. On the other hand, when piit = 1/2 for all i, the setting boils down to an
unbiased, pure common values model.15
The two alternative models of behavior differ in how much information each justice has
in equilibrium. In the expressive voting model, justices care about their own ruling,
and therefore vote based on their own information sit, i.e., rule against the Defendant
whenever Pri(ωt = P |sit) ≥ piit. Then E consists only of sit, and i votes to rule against
the Defendant if
Pr(sit|ωt = 1)
Pr(sit|ωt = 0) =
φ(θit[sit − 1])
φ(θitsit)
≥ piit
1− piit
1− ρt
ρt
(1)
Let sexpit denote the value of sit that solves (1) with equality. By the MLRP the ratio
L(s) ≡ Pr(s|ωt = 1)/Pr(s|ωt = 0) is increasing in s, so that i rules against the Defendant
whenever sit ≥ sexpit , and in favor of the Defendant otherwise. These cutoff points sexpit for
i = 1, . . . , n completely characterize behavior in the expressive voting case. Therefore we
can write the likelihood of the justices’ votes in case t in the expressive voting model as
Pr(vt) ≡
∑
ωt
Pr(ωt)
n∏
i=1
[1− Φ(θit[sexpit − ωt])]vitΦ(θit[sexpit − ωt])1−vit (2)
In the strategic voting model, justices care about the ruling of the court. As
a result, any justice i then considers the implications of her vote assuming that she is
pivotal for the decision. (This supposition is not correct when the justice is not in fact
pivotal, but for the same reason these mistakes have no cost for the outcome-oriented
justice.) Here, the relevant information for justice i in case t is not only her private
information sit, but also the equilibrium information contained in the event that i is
pivotal for the court’s decision, given the equilibrium strategy profile followed by the
remaining justices. Let µjt : R → [0, 1] denote the strategy of justice j in case t, where
µjt(sjt) ≡ Pr(vjt = 1|sjt). Then (1) becomes
Pµ−i(pivit|ωt = 1)
Pµ−i(pivit|ωt = 0)
φ(θit[sit − 1])
φ(θitsit)
≥ piit
1− piit
1− ρt
ρt
(3)
As before, the MLRP implies that i’s best response to any strategy µ−i,t of the
remaining justices is a cutoff strategy, such that i rules in favor of the Plaintiff (µi,t(sit) =
1) if sit satisfies (3), and in favor of the Defendant (µit(sit) = 0) otherwise. This in turn
implies that all responsive equilibria are cutoff equilibria; i.e., that any equilibrium is
characterized by cutpoints sstit for each justice i = 1, . . . , n such that justice i votes
against the Defendant if and only if sit ≥ sstit . Now, given cutoff strategies, Pr(vit =
15In our setting, justices share common priors, but their ideological biases are captured by the piit
parameters. See Froeb and Kobayashi (1996) for a model where justices’ biases are manifested in their
priors.
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1|ωt) =
∫
µit(s)φ(θit[s − ωt])ds = [1 − Φ(θit[sstit − ωt])]. Therefore from (3), and letting
CiR−1 denote the set of coalitions C ⊂ N \ i with R− 1 members, {sstit}ni=1 is given by the
n equations
∑
C∈CR−1
(∏
j∈C [1− Φ(θjt[sstjt − 1])]
)(∏
j 6=i,j /∈C Φ(θjt[s
st
jt − 1])
)
∑
C∈CR−1
(∏
j∈C [1− Φ(θjtsstjt)]
)(∏
j 6=i,j /∈C Φ(θjts
st
jt)
) φ(θit[sstit − 1])
φ(θitsstit )
=
piit
1− piit
1− ρt
ρt
(4)
The cutpoints {sstit} completely characterize behavior in any such equilibrium. Given
{sstit}, we can write the likelihood of the justices’ votes in case t in the strategic voting
case as
Pr(vt) ≡
∑
ωt
Pr(ωt)
n∏
i=1
[1− Φ(θit[sstit − ωt])]vitΦ(θit[sstit − ωt])1−vit (5)
The likelihood functions for the expressive and the strategic models (Eqs. 2,5) are
almost identical, except for the cutoff points: sexp for the expressive model, and sst for
the strategic model.16
4 Estimation
In this section we describe the estimation procedure. To simplify the exposition, we
begin with the simplest scenario in which all cases are assumed to be homogeneous, in
the sense that all the parameters of the model, {(θi, pii)}ni=1, as well as ρ, are assumed to
be identical across cases. This allows us to introduce the key ideas in a simplified setting.
We then extend the analysis to the general case in which types and priors vary across
cases, depending on case-specific covariates Xt. This general framework is the one we
use in our actual empirical work.
Our estimation procedure has two parts, which we describe in order.
Estimation: First step. We introduce the following notation:
16We argued that any equilibrium in the expressive and strategic voting models must be in cutoff
strategies. In the strategic voting model, however, it is possible that equilibrium is not unique; i.e., that
given a prior ρ and types (θi, pii) for i = 1, . . . , n, there is more than one vector of cutpoints sst solving
(4). Here we assume that if there are multiple equilibria, justices consistently play the same equilibrium
whenever the characteristics of the problem are unchanged. It should be noted, however, that in the
estimation, for any vector of conditional voting probabilities in the first stage (see Section 4), we recover
the types (θi, pii) uniquely.
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Priors: ρ ≡ Pr(ωt = 1) Voting Probs.: γi,1 ≡ Pr(vit = 1|ωt = 1)
1− ρ = Pr(ωt = 0) γi,0 ≡ Pr(vit = 1|ωt = 0)
Given this notation, the first-step estimation problem (in both the expressive as well
as the strategic case) is to maximize the following reduced-form likelihood function for
the votes:
max
{γi,1,γi,0}ni=1,ρ
Pr(vt) = ρ
n∏
i=1
[
γviti,1 (1− γi,1)1−vit
]
+ (1− ρ)
n∏
i=1
[
γviti,0 (1− γi,0)1−vit
]
s.t. γi,1 ≥ γi,0, ∀i.
(6)
Conditional on the state ωt, the individual votes vit are independent across the justices
i. Thus, the vector of votes vt follows a multivariate mixture distribution, with mixing
probability ρ.
Second step. Using the estimates of the two justice-specific vote probabilities γˆi,1 and
γˆi,0, from the first step, we recover the two structural parameters, pii and θi, for each
justice i. Recall our earlier assumptions that justice i’s private information is sit =
ωt +
1
θi
εit, with εit ∼ N (0, 1). Then γi,1 ≡ 1 − Φ (θi[s∗i − 1])) and γi,0 ≡ (1 − Φ(θis∗i )).
Solving these equations for θi and s
∗
i given γˆi,1 and γˆi,0 (and substituting Φ
−1(γi,1) =
−Φ−1(1− γi,1)) gives 17
θˆi = Φ
−1(1− γˆi,0)− Φ−1(1− γˆi,1); sˆi = Φ
−1(1− γˆi,0)
Φ−1(1− γˆi,0) + Φ−1(γˆi,1) (7)
Note that the estimate of θˆi, the precision of i’s information, is given by the difference
between the conditional probabilities of voting in favor of the Plaintiff when the law favors
the Plaintiff (ω = 1) and when the law favors the Defendant (ω = 0). This implies that
precision is increasing in the probability of correctly ruling in favor of the Plaintiff (γi,1),
and decreasing in γi,0, which is the probability of incorrectly ruling against the defendant.
This is very intuitive in light of the theoretical model.
The estimate of the equilibrium cutpoint, instead, is a decreasing function of the ratio
between Φ−1(γˆi,1) and Φ−1(1 − γˆi,0). Thus sˆi is (roughly) decreasing in the ratio of the
probability of voting correctly in favor of the Plaintiff (γi,1) relative to the probability of
correctly voting in favor of the Defendant (1−γi,0). When this ratio is large, for instance
– indicating a bias towards the plaintiff – the cutpoint sˆi will be small, implying that the
justice requires a low informational threshold to vote in favor of the plaintiff.
17Note that for each justice, we use the estimates of γi,0, γi,1 to recover the two quantities θi and si.
For this reason, we consider a one-parameter specification of the information structure; with additional
parameters, we might not have identification.
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In order to recover the bias parameter pii, we use the equilibrium voting condition,
which differs between the expressive and strategic models. In the case of the expressive
voting model, this is given by
φ(θi[sˆi − 1])
φ(θisˆi)
=
pˆiexpi
1− pˆiexpi
1− ρˆ
ρˆ
, (8)
while in the strategic voting model this is given by[
1− Φ(θi[sˆi − 1])
1− Φ(θisˆi)
]R−1 [
Φ(θi[sˆi − 1])
Φ(θisˆi)
]n−R
φ(θi[sˆi − 1])
φ(θisˆi)
=
pˆisti
1− pˆisti
1− ρˆ
ρˆ
(9)
For both models, plugging in our estimates of θi and sˆi into the appropriate equilibrium
condition allows us to recover estimates of pˆiexpi and pˆi
st
i for the expressive and strategic
models, respectively.
Note that, in recovering θi, it was not necessary to specify whether justices vote
expressively or strategically. An assumption regarding strategic or expressive voting
is required only for recovering pii. This distinction between θi and pii is a remarkable
property of this problem. It implies that the precision estimate is independent of whether
justices care about the court ruling or about their own vote being correct, and therefore
of whether justices use the information contained in the event of them being pivotal or
simply best respond to their own private information.
Accommodating Case and Justice Heterogeneity. While our foregoing discussion
assumed that all cases are homogeneous, our empirical model accommodates case-level
heterogeneity by allowing the reduced-form parameters of the model – which are recovered
in the first step of the estimation procedure – to depend quite flexibly on observable
characteristics Xt. Specifically, we parameterize justices’ priors in case t, ρt ≡ Pr(ωt = 1),
as a logit probability which depends on the characteristics Xt:
ρ(Xt; β) ≡ exp(X
′
tβ)
1 + exp(X ′tβ)
, ∈ [0, 1].
Once the prior probability ρt varies across cases, so will the equilibrium strategies s
∗
it, and
hence so will the justice-specific conditional probabilities of ruling against the Defendant
γit,1 and γit,0.
Accordingly, we also parameterize these probabilities to depend upon Xt (covariates
for case t) and Zi (covariates for justice i) in the following way, which also restricts
γi,t,1 ≥ γi,t,0, for all Xt:
γi,0(ζ, η) =
exp(Z ′iζ +X
′
tη)
1 + exp(Z ′iζ +X
′
tη)
, ∈ [0, 1];
γi,1(ζ, η, α, δ) =
γi,0 + exp(Z
′
iα +X
′
tδ)
1 + exp(Z ′iα +X
′
tδ)
, ∈ [γi,0(ζ, η), 1].
(10)
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In the first stage, we estimate the parameters (β, δ, η) as well as the justice-specific
variables (αi, ζi) for i = 1, . . . , n. For this, we maximize the following likelihood function
max
α,β,ζ,η,δ
∑
t
log
[
ρ(Xt; β) ·
n∏
i=1
{
γi,1(ζ, η, α, δ)
vit(1− γi,1(ζ, η, α, δ))1−vit
}
+(1− ρ(Xt; β)) ·
n∏
i=1
{
γi,0(ζ, η)
vit(1− γi,0(ζ, η))1−vit
}]
.
(11)
For the second stage, we use the predicted values of γi,t,1 and γi,t,0 to recover case and
justice specific values of θit and s
∗
it, using the equations in (7). We can then compute the
bias estimates solving the n equations (4) for the strategic voting model, or (1) (with
equality) for the expressive voting model. Note that, when the voting probabilities γi.0
and γi,1 are case-specific and depend on the covariates X and Z, then so will the model
parameters θ and pi.
Identification. Clearly, identification of model parameters hinges on the identification
of the reduced-form parameters from the first-stage MLE. This in turns relies crucially
on the mixture structure of the votes, which are unconditionally dependent due to the
unobserved state ωt. Specifically, consider a state supreme court with n = 9 justices
(such as Texas). In this case, the vote vector vt can take 2
9 values, and with a large
enough dataset, it is possible to estimate the probability that vt takes each of these values
by the empirical frequency. On the other hand, there are only 19 parameters (18 vote
probabilities, and ρ) to estimate, thus satisfying a necessary condition for identification.18
At a more intuitive level, the key for identification is that the common value induces a
correlation of votes in equilibrium: all justices tend to receive larger signals when the law
favors the Plaintiff, and all justices tend to receive smaller signals when the law favors
the Defendant.
Suppose first that cases are homogeneous, so that justices’ types and prior are in-
variant across cases. If justices’ quality of information were large relative to their bias,
and the prior relatively uninformative (say pii ≈ 1/2 for all i and ρ ≈ 1/2), the court
would “flip-flop” evenly between unanimous pro-defendant and pro-plaintiff decisions.
Now suppose that instead ρ ≈ 2/3. Since in this case the law favors the Plaintiff more
frequently, justices will tend to receive large signals more frequently (moreover, to com-
pensate for the larger prior, justices will also use strategies that are more favorable for
the Plaintiff). As a result, the majority of the court would rule for the Plaintiff more
often than before. This illustrates the first intuition: the frequency in which the majority
18 Moreover, the inequality γi,1 > γi,0, which is implied by the monotone likelihood ratio property,
is crucial for identification: without this assumption, the voting probabilities would only be identified
up to an arbitrary classification of ωt. This inequality resolves this classification problem by setting γi,1
(γi,0) equal to the maximum (minimum) of the two identified voting probabilities. For more details, see
Hall and Zhou (2003) or the discussion in Iaryczower and Shum (2009).
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decision favors the Plaintiff tracks the prior ρ: a larger frequency corresponds to a larger
estimated prior ρ.
Now suppose that we change the bias of one justice i in our previous example so
that her bias is large relative to the quality of her information. Then while all other
justices will alternate between sometimes finding for the Plaintiff and sometimes for the
Defendant, i will stay put in one decision. This illustrates the second principle at work:
absence of variability in individual decisions signals large bias. Finally, return to the
previous example in which all justices are moderate. As we pointed out before, if the
quality of information is sufficiently high for all justices, then we would expect these to
be unanimous votes. But as the quality of information of some justices is lower, these
justices would disagree with the majority more often. This suggests the third principle:
justices with variable voting records who tend to be in the minority are associated with
a low quality of information.
Now, as it is, this identification scheme appears to penalize “maverick” justices who
go against the grain by assigning them a low precision parameter. However, in the em-
pirical work, we control for many case-specific covariates, and take into account inherent
differences among justices due to political ideology, judicial experience, etc. Therefore,
justices with low θ’s are those who have attributes that characterize justices who vote
inconsistently, even after taking characteristics of the case into account: these are not
maverick justices, but erratic ones.
5 Bureaucrats and Politicians
Having characterized equilibrium behavior (Section 3) and having described our estima-
tion procedure (Section 4), we can now begin to uncover the differences in type and
performance of bureaucrats and politicians. In order to do so, we apply our method to
decisions on criminal cases by US states’ Supreme Courts. The variability in selection
and retention methods across states and the common task across courts (after controlling
for case-specific heterogeneity) allows us to pin down the selection and incentive effects
of institutions on justices’ unobservable types.
5.1 Data and Specification
The data for this project has primarily been collected from the State Court Data Project
(Brace, Langer, and Hall (2000)), with additional information obtained from the Court
Statistics Project at the National Center for State Courts, Marquis’ Who’s Who, and
the updated version of Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson (1998). The State Court
Data Project (SCDP) provides a detailed compilation of data for state Supreme Court
cases in all 50 states of the United States during the years 1995 through 1998. The
database contains a case-level dataset that describe the particulars of each case during
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this time frame, including the decision of each justice of the relevant court. The SCDP
also includes a justice-level dataset, that provides data for each of the 520 justices that
served on some court during the period observed, including whether the justice was
elected or appointed, and whether the justice served for life or faced either reelection
or reappointment to the bench. Marquis’ Who’s Who provided additional biographical
information on each justice.
The courts themselves are described in depth in the Court Statistics Project (CSP),
which collects data related to the administrative and legal structure of the state Courts
in the United States. The basic layout shared across every state includes at least one
trial court, one or more appeals courts, and a court of last resort (generally the Supreme
Court). Exceptions to the basic design first include New York, in which the Supreme
Court acts as an appeals court and the Court of Appeals acts as the court of last resort,
and second, Oklahoma, where there are two courts of last resort dedicated to criminal
and civil cases, respectively. For the purposes of this paper, the term “Supreme Court”
refers to the court of last resort as it pertains to a given case. Furthermore, while cases
may originate in the trial court and move through appeals to the Supreme Court, there
are many cases for which the various Supreme Courts have original jurisdiction.
Within our data, we retained those cases that were complete in their information and
in which the justices sat en banc.19 This left a total of 5958 criminal cases across the
fifty states. We then pool the data across all natural courts according to the following
specification.
As case-specific covariates, we included basic information about the case, the parties
involved, and the legal issue under consideration. These include the manner in which
the State Supreme Court takes jurisdiction (Original, Appeal or Habeas Corpus), the
type (whether Person, Business, or Government) of Plaintiff and Defendant, the class
of legal issues under consideration (issues of evidence, sentencing and jury instruction,
and others), and whether a formal opinion was issued with the case as opposed to a per
curiam opinion. It is possible that courts in some states might have a more difficult
task ahead of them than others as a result of differences in the mix of cases varying
in complexity. These differences might be particularly relevant between murder cases
and lesser offenses, and for cases involving constitutional challenges. To account for this
possibility, we include as an additional covariate whether the original crime considered
was murder or not, as well as whether the death penalty was imposed by lower courts
or not. We also include whether the case involved a challenge of a law based on the US
or State Constitutions, and the number of legal issues considered by the supreme court
in each case. Table 7 in the Appendix summarizes the case-specific data, including the
proportion of unanimous and minimal winning votes in each state. While a majority of
19Note that the equilibrium cutpoint of each justice will be different for each different composition
of the voting members of the court, implying different conditional probabilities of ruling in favor of the
Plaintiff in each state for each configuration of voting members, even fixing the covariates Xt. Including
only the votes in which all justices vote therefore dramatically reduces the number of parameters to be
estimated. This still leaves a significant number of cases in the sample (see Table 7).
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cases are decided by unanimous verdict, there is also a sizable fraction of non-unanimous
verdicts. Moreover, there is, on average, a smaller proportion of unanimous verdicts in
courts composed of elected judges (69% of cases), than those composed of appointed
judges (over 80% of cases), a pattern which is somewhat at odds with the Visser and
Swank (2007) model, where justices signal only ability, but not bias.
As justice-specific covariates we include three classes of variables, which we call experi-
ence variables, institutional variables, and context variables. Experience variables include
the number of years of prior judicial experience, whether each justice had prior political
experience or not, and the number of years serving in the state supreme court. Institu-
tional variables describe the selection and retention methods in the state in which the
justice serves. While this has considerable variability across states in the detailed speci-
fication, we summarize this information in whether the justice was elected or appointed,
and in this case, whether she was appointed for life by elected officials, appointed for
one term by elected officials with a possible reappointment by the same elected officials,
or appointed for one term by elected officials with a possible reappointment depending
on an up-or-down decision by voters in a retention election.20 Context variables include
Brace, Langer, and Hall (2000)’s party-adjusted judicial ideology (PAJID) score for each
Justice at the time of appointment (capturing selection effects) and for each case, the in-
teraction of the institutional variables with the (updated version of) Berry et al’s citizen
(CIT) and government (GOV) ideology (Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson (1998))
for the relevant state in the year in which the decision was made (capturing incentive
effects). The justice-specific data is summarized in Table 8 in the Appendix.
5.2 First Stage Coefficients and a First Look at Deep Parame-
ters
This section has two purposes. We begin by discussing the first-stage estimates, focusing
on the statistical – as opposed to economic or substantive – significance of the variables
of interest. We then present a full example of our second stage estimates to aid the
interpretation of the general results. We leave the discussion of the general substantive
results and the “economic” significance of covariates for the next section.
Table 1 presents the “first stage” MLE estimates of the coefficients of the common
prior function ρ(Xt), and of the state-contingent probabilities of ruling against the De-
fendant γ0(Xt, Zit) and γ1(Xt, Zit).
[Table 1 about here]
20There is further variability within these classes. In all states in which justices are originally appointed
and later face a retention election, the appointment is made by the Governor from nominees selected
by a nominating commission. However, the term of the appointments can vary (typically between
one and three years in the original term, between six and ten years if retained). In other states, the
Governor’s appointment requires the confirmation Senate, and in others the appointment is a legislative
action. Terms also vary. For more detail, see the website of the American Judicature Society, at
http://www.judicialselection.us.
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First note that all but one of the case-specific covariates have a statistically significant
effect on either justices’ prior belief about the case, or their conditional probability of
ruling in favor of the Plaintiff in each state.21 This is important in that it suggests that
our case-specific covariates are allowing us to capture significant variation among states
that is due to heterogeneity in case-selection across states.
Consider now the central question of interest here: do political institutions have
an effect on justices’ bias and quality of information? If this were the case, political
institutions would have an effect on justices’ equilibrium conditional voting probabilities.
We separate the discussion about the results in Table 1 into selection and incentive effects.
We begin with selection effects. Consider first PAJID, Brace et al’s party-adjusted
judicial ideology scores at the time of appointment. Recall that by construction, this
variable captures the political “preferences” of the principal that is relevant to the selec-
tion of each justice, be it voters or elected officials. As we can see in the table, PAJID
has a statistically significant effect on type, through the state-contingent probabilities of
ruling against the Defendant. PAJID captures at least part of the selection effect. Now,
if different institutional variables have a systematic effect on justices’ type in addition
to that induced by the preferences of the principal selecting individuals to the court (as
measured by PAJID) then their direct effect (unaffected by context variables at the time
of decision) should also capture a selection effect. The results suggest that this is in fact
the case: justices in different institutional classes have statistically significant differences
in their conditional voting probabilities even after controlling for variation in the con-
text variables describing the attitudes of the voters and elected politicians. Finally for
selection components, note that all the experience variables (judicial experience, politi-
cal experience, and experience in the court) have a statistically significant effect on the
state-contingent probabilities of ruling against the Defendant.
Consider next incentive effects. These are captured here by the interaction of the
institutional variables with the context variables at the time of the decision. In fact, note
that as would be expected, the context variables CIT and GOV only have non-zero effect
when interacted with the institutional variables. Next, note that the measure of citizens’
ideology CIT is relevant for elected justices, but does not have a statistically significant
effect on the conditional voting probabilities of non-elected justices (of any class). This
result is consistent with the predictions of the literature, and also with the findings of
previous applied research (see Section 2). It also suggests, in particular, that up-or-
down retention elections are a poor channel for the expression of citizens’ preferences.
In regards with the GOV measure of the ideology of elected officials, we find that – as
one would expect – GOV has a statistically significant effect on the conditional voting
probabilities of appointed justices that are to face political reappointment, but does not
have a corresponding effect on the behavior justices appointed for life. The only somewhat
unexpected result is that GOV also has a statistically significant effect on the conditional
21The sole exception here is whether the case was one in which the court had Original jurisdiction,
which is statistically undistinguishable from cases of Habeas Corpus. Instead, cases in which the Court
acquired jurisdiction from an appeal are statistically significantly different than these base cases.
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voting probabilities of elected justices. However, this result would hardly constitute an
anomaly, as it could indicate that elected officials might be influential (through funding
or campaigning) in the electoral outcomes of judicial elections.
All in all, the results of the first-stage are very compelling, and provide strong evidence
of a (statistically) significant effect of political institutions on justices’ prior beliefs and
their equilibrium conditional voting probabilities, due to both selection effects (uniformly)
and incentive effects (for justices who are either elected, or face a political reappointment).
Deep Parameters’ Estimates: an Example. Given the first stage coefficients we
can compute, for any case t with characteristics Xt, the common prior ρt = ρ(Xt), as well
as the conditional probabilities γi,t,0 = γ0(Xt, Zit) and γi,t,1 = γ1(Xt, Zit) that a Justice
with characteristics Zit in case t rules for the Plaintiff when the law favors the Plaintiff
and when the law favors the Defendant. For a given court composition C, we can then
use the predicted values of γi,t,1 and γi,t,0 for each member i of C to recover the case and
justice specific values of s∗it, and the “deep parameters” θit and piit.
To describe the main results we fix all case-specific covariates at the state-specific
sample means, and use the justice-specific covariates of the justices sitting in each state’s
Supreme Court. In particular, when there is more than one court composition (natural
court) per state in the data (as it usually is the case), we report results for the largest
natural court (LNC); i.e. the court that decided more cases than any other natural court
of the same state. We begin by presenting the complete set of estimates for three sample
courts – the LNCs of California, Connecticut and Texas – to aid the interpretation of
the general results. (For simplicity of exposition, in Table 2, we present point estimates
only. Table 6 in the Appendix provides standard errors of all “second-stage” estimates
presented in Table 2.)
[Table 2 about here]
In the table, we indicate the MLE estimate of the common prior probability that the
law favors the Plaintiff in each state. In these examples, the prior probability of the law
favoring the Plaintiff is ρ = 0.67 for California, ρ = 0.54 for Connecticut, and ρ = 0.61
for Texas. This indicates that given their specific case selection, in all three states the
common prior belief favors the Plaintiff. This is a moderate effect for Connecticut, where
the prior is close to the uninformative prior of ρ = 1/2, but more significant for Texas
and California.
The first two columns present the MLE estimates of the probability that justice i
rules in favor of the Plaintiff when the law favors the Defendant (γit0) and when the law
favors the Plaintiff (γit1). Thus, for example, justice Marvin Baxter of California had
a probability of γit1 = 0.93 of (correctly) ruling in favor of the Plaintiff when the law
favors the Plaintiff, and a probability of 1 − γit0 = 1 − 0.15 = 0.85 of (correctly) ruling
in favor of the Defendant when the law favors the Defendant. Similarly, justice Robert
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Berdon of Connecticut had a probability of γit1 = 0.97 of (correctly) ruling in favor of the
Plaintiff when the law favors the Plaintiff, and a probability of 1− γit0 = 1− 0.03 = 0.97
of (correctly) ruling in favor of the Defendant when the law favors the Defendant.
Column 3 presents the estimate of the quality of the information of each justice. As
we pointed out earlier, this estimate is an increasing function of the difference between
the probability that justice i rules in favor of the Plaintiff when the law favors the Plaintiff
and when the law favors the Defendant. The higher quality-of-information estimate for
justice Berdon (3.70) vis a vis that of justice Baxter (2.51), for example, reflects both a
larger probability of (correctly) ruling for the Plaintiff when the law favors the Plaintiff
(0.97 vs 0.93), and a lower probability of (incorrectly) ruling for the Plaintiff when the
law favors the Defendant (0.03 vs 0.15).
Column 4 presents the equilibrium cutpoint. This is the signal threshold s∗i such that
Justice i votes for the Defendant whenever she observes a signal below s∗i and for the
Plaintiff otherwise. Thus for example while justice Berdon would vote for the Defendant
after observing a signal below s∗BER = 0.49, it would take a signal below s
∗
BAX = 0.41 for
justice Baxter, and a signal below s∗BAI = 0.38 for justice Charles Baird from Texas to
rule in favor of the Defendant. As we noted before, the cutpoint estimate for each justice
i is a decreasing function of the ratio between Φ−1(γˆ1) and Φ−1(1 − γˆ0). To illustrate
this in the context of our example, this ratio is 1.03 = 1.88/1.82 for justice Berdon,
1.46 = 1.48/1.02 for justice Baxter, and 1.64 = 1.56/0.95 for justice Baird.
Given the estimates, we can also understand the ordering of equilibrium cutpoints in
terms of the case specific prior and the justice/case specific type of each justice. First,
for Berdon, Baxter and Baird, the prior stacks the deck in favor of the Plaintiff, and
contributes to a larger equilibrium cutpoint for all justices (more so for Baxter and Baird,
moderately so for Berdon). The second factor at play here is the bias of the justice in
question (and in the strategic voting model, also of the remaining justices in the court,
through their equilibrium strategy s∗−i). The justices’ bias are shown in columns 5 and
6 in the table. Note that in both the strategic and the expressive voting models, justice
Baird of Texas is more inclined to rule in favor of the Plaintiff than justice Berdon of
Connecticut, and him in turn more than justice Baxter of California. In the expressive
voting model, for example, for the type of case each of these justices “typically” faces,
justice Baird requires less evidence (a belief of at least piexpBAI = 042 that the law favors
the Plaintiff) to rule in favor of the Plaintiff than justice Berdon (piexpBER = 0.51) and
justice Baxter (piexpBAX = 0.53). The third factor is the quality of information of each
justice. A larger quality of information θi pushes i’s cutpoints towards 1/2, the threshold
of an “unbiased” justice. This explains why in equilibrium Berdon uses a “much more
moderate” strategy than Baxter in both the strategic and the expressive voting models.
Column 7 indicates for each justice i, the ratio of the probability that i is pivotal
when other justices follow their equilibrium strategies and the law favors the Plaintiff
and the corresponding probability when the law favors the defendant. We can see in
the Table that in equilibrium, in California, Connecticut and Texas the event of being
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pivotal conveys favorable information for the Defendant. This is why in all three states
justices are more biased in favor of the Plaintiff in the strategic voting model than in
the expressive voting model: in order to be consistent with the same cutpoint as in
the expressive voting model, a justice has to be more “biased” towards the Plaintiff
(Defendant) whenever the equilibrium information favors the Defendant (Plaintiff).
Given these estimates, we can compute a measure of the value of information in
the court, as introduced in Iaryczower and Shum (2009). The measure, FLEX, is the
probability that justice i votes differently than what she would have voted for in the
absence of her private case information:
FLEXit =
{
ρtΦ(θit[s
∗
it − 1]) + (1− ρt)Φ(θits∗it) if ρt ≥ piit
ρt[1− Φ(θit[s∗it − 1])] + (1− ρt)[1− Φ(θits∗it)] if ρt < piit. (12)
Note that FLEX is bounded between zero and one, and takes a value of zero for indi-
viduals with extremely large biases either for the Plaintiff (pi → 0) or for the Defendant
(pi → 1).22 Note, moreover, that FLEX scores integrate information about the quality of
information and bias of each justice. The FLEX scores for the expressive and strategic
voting models are presented in columns 8 and 9 of the table. Consistent with our pre-
vious remarks, the value of information in the court is on average higher for justices in
Connecticut than for justices in California and Texas.
5.3 Main Results
We can now begin to answer the questions that we laid out at the beginning of the pa-
per. Our goal is to understand the differences in type and performance of appointed and
elected justices. Does the type of institution used to select and retain justices have a
systematic impact on the quality and bias of the individuals serving in the court? More-
over, we seek to shed light on the roles of the selection and incentive effects. Do voters
select a different type of justice – more or less biased, better or worst at gathering and
processing information relevant to the case –than government officials? Do reelections,
retention elections and political reappointment procedures induce justices serving in the
court to spend more or less effort to improve their proficiency to deal with the flow of
information of each case, or to be more or less responsive to the public? Do voters select a
different type of justice – more or less biased, better or worst at gathering and processing
22 Note also that the computation of FLEX for the expressive and strategic voting models differ only
in whether we use piexpi or pi
st
i to evaluate whether ρ ≥ pii or ρ ≤ pii. The reason for this is that the
equilibrium cutpoint s∗i that is recovered from the data is invariant to whether we use the expressive or
strategic voting models. Together with the data, the two models imply the same s∗i and θi, and differ
only in the biases pii that rationalize these quantities. As a result, in practical terms this means that the
expressive and strategic FLEX scores for any given justice and any given realization of the covariates
Xt are very often identical. If instead we were initially given values of {pii, θi} and ρ, then the two
models would imply a different equilibrium cutpoint s∗i , and FLEX scores in the two models would differ
significantly.
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information relevant to the case –than government officials? Do reelections, retention
elections and political reappointment procedures induce justices serving in the court to
spend more or less effort to improve their proficiency to deal with the flow of information
associated to each case? Do reelections or retention elections induce justices serving in
the court to be more or less responsive to the public?
Table 3 presents the state averages (of the individual estimates for each justice i in the
LNC of each state) of the prior probability that the law favors the Plaintiff, the conditional
probabilities of voting in favor of the Plaintiff when the law favors the Defendant and the
Plaintiff (γi,0, γi,1), the equilibrium strategy cutpoint s
∗
i , and the justice type (θi, pii). As
in Table 2, the estimates for each court are computed here with case-specific variables
evaluated at their state-specific sample means, and individual justices evaluated at their
own justice-specific variables (i.e., Table 3 presents the averages of the table 2 estimates
for each of the fifty state courts). The states are arranged in four groups, according to the
broad class of institutions for selection and retention they use. The first is the group of
states in which justices are elected in competitive plurality elections. The second group
includes states in which justices are originally appointed by elected officials, but face an
up-or-down decision by voters in a retention election to retain their position in the court.
The third group includes states in which justices are appointed by elected officials, and
considered for reappointment after a first term also by elective officials. The fourth group
includes states in which justices are appointed by elected officials for life.23
[Table 3 about here]
We pointed out in Section 5.2 that our case-specific covariates have a statistically
significant effect on the prior probability that the law favors the Plaintiff. Table 3 shows
that they are also substantively significant. The substantial variation in priors across
states suggests that we are able to control for what is a significant heterogeneity in
case-selection across states. The inclusion of these case-specific variables is important
to assure that the remaining variation in types is due to institutional factors and not to
unaccounted heterogeneity in the type of cases considered by each court.
Table 3 shows that the different institutions for election and retention of justices
have a significant impact on the quality (θ) and value of information (FLEX) in the
court. First, justices that do not face any kind of voter evaluation after being appointed
on average have higher quality of information than justices that face either reelection
or retention elections. In fact, the information quality for justices appointed for life
and justices that are appointed and reappointed is on average 25% larger than that of
justices facing retention elections, and 30% larger than that of justices that are elected.
The effects are substantively and statistically significant.
The institutions of selection and retention of justices also influence justices’ predispo-
sition to rule in favor or against the Defendant, as measured by pi. In particular, justices
23We include New Jersey in this group because upon being reappointed, justices are appointed for life.
Illinois, New Mexico and Pennsylvania have up-or-down retention elections for reappointment.
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that do not face any kind of voter evaluation after being appointed are on average more
biased than those who do (in both the expressive and strategic voting models). However,
these differences in bias across voting institutions are less striking than the differences in
quality. In the expressive voting model, for example, the average elected justice would
rule in favor of the Defendant only if after all information is taken into consideration,
the posterior probability that the law favors the Plaintiff is below E[piexp|elected] = 0.41.
Instead, the average justice appointed subject to a reappointment would rule in favor
of the Defendant only if the posterior probability that the law favors the Plaintiff is be-
low E[piexp|Reapp] = 0.40, and the average justice appointed for life only if it is below
E[piexp|life] = 0.37.
The preceding results imply that, in determining the value of information in the court,
differences in information quality across institutional environments trump differences in
bias. As was the case with the quality of information, FLEX scores are also larger on
average the more isolated justices are from voters. The average FLEX score for elected
justices (0.36) is lower than that of appointed justices facing retention elections (0.38),
this in turn lower than that for appointed justices facing political reappointment (0.39),
and this is turn lower than that for justices appointed for life (0.41).
Selection and Incentive Effects & Case Heterogeneity. In Table 3 we computed
the estimated type of justices in different states allowing all case-specific and justice-
specific covariates to vary. This is the appropriate exercise to obtain the total effect
of political institutions on justices’ bias and quality of information. In this section, we
complement these results in two ways.
First, it is important to establish that differences in type are not just due to het-
erogeneity in case-selection across states. Note that since we allow justices’ types to
vary in response to changes in case-specific covariates, then – even after controlling for
variation in our case-specific covariates in the estimation – the previous results reflect
differences in case-selection across states. In order to eliminate completely heterogene-
ity in case-selection, we recompute the types of justices in the LNC of each state fixing
case-specific covariates at the national sample mean. In Table 4 (column 2), we report
the state averages of the bias and quality of information fixing case-specific covariates at
the national sample mean. Comparing these results with our benchmark result (column
1) shows that differences in type persist even after we impose a homogeneous caseload
across state courts: the patterns we uncovered in types across institutions are not due to
heterogeneous case-selection. The first main message in Table 4 then, is that it is indeed
institutions that drive the main results.
Second, note that justices differ not only in the selection and retention methods they
face, but also in observable characteristics at the time of their appointment (PAJID,
prior judicial and political experience), in their experience in the court at the time of
the decision, and in the context they face at the time of the decision (CIT and GOV
measures of citizen and government ideology). As a result, Table 3 lumps together the
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impact that institutions have on the bias and information quality of justices through
the incentives they provide for individuals to advance their political and judicial careers,
with that caused by their systematic effect on the selection of justices of different types.
To disentangle these incentive and selection effects, we recompute the type estimates
fixing case-specific covariates at the national sample mean and justices’ PAJID scores
and experience variables (prior political, prior judicial, and in the court) at their average
for all justices in LNCs. The residual within-class variation can be attributed to the
forward-looking impact of institutions through the incentives they provide justices to
advance their political and judicial careers. We report the state averages of the bias and
quality of information computed in this way in the third column/s of Table 4.
[Table 4 about here]
The results suggest that incentive effects are mainly circumscribed to elected posi-
tions. Consider first non-elected justices facing up-or-down retention elections. Note that
fixing PAJID scores and experience among justices eliminates practically all variability
in types across justices in this class. Since incentive effects are context specific – and
thus state specific as well – this indicates a weak incentive effect for justices facing reten-
tion elections. It follows that almost all of the variability in justices’ types across states
with retention elections for justices can be attributed to heterogeneity in case selection,
selection effects (PAJID, judicial and political experience) and differences in experience
in the court. A similar conclusion can be drawn for the other classes of appointed jus-
tices, although in these cases fixing PAJID scores and experience among justices cannot
account for all variability in types within class.24
For elected justices, the opposite is true. Note that in columns 1 and 2, the qual-
ity of information of elected justices has a similar average and variability than that of
non-elected justices facing retention elections. But fixing PAJID scores and experience
among elected justices leaves almost all within-group variability in bias and quality of
information unaccounted for. This suggests that differences in selection (PAJID, judicial
and political experience) and experience in the court have a relatively small impact on
the type of elected justices. Thus, as long as our selection and experience variables cap-
ture selection effects adequately, the bulk of the variability in types of elected justices
must be attributed to incentive effects.
Effectiveness of Bureaucrats and Politicians. Tables 3 and 4 focused on how
selection and retention procedures impact justices’s bias and quality of information. Ul-
timately, however, we care about this because of how it impacts on outcomes. In our
next results, we switch attention from the type of justices to their performance: is there a
systematic difference in the performance of elected and appointed justices? In the context
24Note however that the incentive effects for this class are also more imprecise, as the context variables
are not statistically significant for non-elected justices (see Table 1).
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of the common value voting model, a natural measure of performance is the probability
of a mistake in the decision of the court. In this section we use the estimated individual
conditional voting probabilities to compute this probability.
Fix a court j. Note that for any given case characteristics X, our first stage estimates
provide the probability that a member i of court j votes for the Defendant when the law
favors the Plaintiff 1− γi,1, and for the Plaintiff when the law favors the Defendant, γi,0
(we drop the obvious dependence on X to simplify notation). For a simple majority rule,
we can then use these individual conditional probabilities to compute the probability that
court j will rule for the Defendant when the law favors the Plaintiff, Pr(vj = 0|ω = 1),
and for the Plaintiff when the law favors the Defendant, Pr(vj = 1|ω = 0).25 Given a
prior ρj, we can then compute the total probability of an incorrect ruling for court j,
βSMj = ρj Pr(vj = 0|ω = 1) + (1− ρj) Pr(vj = 1|ω = 0)
Figure 1 shows the probability of an incorrect ruling in each state of nature (a ruling
for the Defendant when the Plaintiff should win, and a ruling for the Plaintiff when the
Defendant should win) and the ex ante probability of an incorrect ruling of any kind, per
state.
[Figure 1 about here]
The total probability of an incorrect ruling βSCj (the bars in the figure) ranges from
under 0.1% for the top five states – New York, Connecticut, New Jersey, Rhode Island,
and Massachusetts – to between 1.4% and 4% for the bottom five states – North Carolina,
Georgia, Kentucky, Nevada and Idaho. Thus, even when individual members have a much
larger probability of making a wrong decision (see Table 3), the “wisdom of the majority”
implies that state supreme courts have a relatively low total error rate.
However, the pattern of mistakes is highly asymmetric. On the one hand, the prob-
ability of an incorrect ruling in favor of the Defendant when the Plaintiff should win is
very low, with most courts having a negligible probability of a mistake of this kind (the
exceptions being Tennessee and Colorado). On the other hand, more than fifteen courts
have a probability above 2% of reaching an incorrect decision in favor of the Plaintiff
when the Defendant should win. In fact, this probability is above 4% for the bottom five
courts, and above 6% for the bottom three.
This asymmetry should come as no surprise given our previous results in Table 3.
Note that in forty three of the fifty states, the mean individual probability of ruling for
the Defendant when the Plaintiff should win (1− γi,1) is strictly smaller than the mean
25Letting C(k) denote the set of coalitions with exactly k members, Pr(vj = 0|ω = 1) =∑9
k=5
∑
C∈C(k)
∏
i∈C(1 − γi,1)
∏
i/∈C γi,1, and Pr(vj = 1|ω = 0) =
∑9
k=5
∑
C∈C(k)
∏
i∈C γi,0
∏
i/∈C(1 −
γi,0).
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individual probability of ruling for the Plaintiff when the Defendant should win (γi,0),
and in only one state (Colorado) the difference is large in size towards the Defendant.
In other words, at the individual level, on average, justices make comparatively large
mistakes in favor of the Plaintiff. This is particularly true for elected justices, for whom
on average 1 − γi,1 ≈ 4% and γi,0 ≈ 16%. The steep asymmetry in type I and type
II errors implies that almost all of the overall probability of a mistake of any kind is
explained by (i) the probability of an incorrect decision in favor of the Plaintiff and (ii)
the prior probability ρj that court j finds itself in the state of nature in which it makes
comparatively fewer mistakes.
Aggregating the court effectiveness results by institutional class reinforces the con-
clusions that we emphasized in the discussion of Table 3. We established there that
justices that do not face any kind of voter evaluation after being appointed on average
have higher quality of information than justices that face either reelection or retention
elections. We also established there that – as a result of the fact that the institutions
of selection and retention of justices affect justices’ type predominantly through their
impact on the quality of information – the same is true for the value of information in
the court. The same conclusion follows here. Quality of information, the value of infor-
mation (FLEX scores), and the effectiveness of the court (the probability of a correct
decision) are all larger on average the more shielded from voters justices are. Specifi-
cally, justices appointed for life and appointed justices with a political reappointment on
average have a lower probability of reaching an incorrect decision (0.1%) than justices
that are appointed and face retention elections (0.4%), and than justices that are elected
(0.9%). The effect is larger when we consider the probability of reaching an incorrect
decision in favor of the Plaintiff. In this case, the corresponding probabilities are 0.3%
for justices that are isolated from voters, 1.1% for justices facing retention elections and
2.6% for justices facing competitive reelections.
Can Unanimity Rule Improve Performance? A natural question here is how the
effectiveness of State Supreme Courts would change if the current method by which they
aggregate the votes of its individual members (simple majority rule) were replaced with a
different decision-making rule. In particular, because of the asymmetry in the pattern of
mistakes in favor of the Plaintiff, it is especially interesting to compare the performance of
the courts under the current rules with a counterfactual scenario in which ruling against
the Defendant requires the unanimous consent of all members.
To evaluate this, we need to compute the probability of mistakes under unanimity.
In the expressive voting model, this is straightforward. Here behavior is unaffected by
the aggregation mechanism, and therefore so are the individual strategy cutpoints and
conditional probabilities. The only change is in the aggregation rule. Here the probability
of the court ruling for the Defendant when the law favors the Plaintiff is 1−∏nji=1(1−γi,1)
and the probability of the court ruling for the Plaintiff when the law favors the Defendant
is
∏9
i=1 γi,0. Thus the total probability of an incorrect ruling for the Supreme Court under
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unanimity rule in the expressive voting model is βU,expj
βU,expj = ρj
[
1−
nj∏
i=1
(1− γi,1)
]
+ (1− ρj)
[
nj∏
i=1
γi,0
]
In the strategic voting model, the computation of the total probability of mistakes
under unanimity rule requires an additional step because the aggregation mechanism now
clearly affects equilibrium behavior. Thus we cannot use the conditional probabilities of
ruling for the Defendant recovered from justices’ votes, but rather we must recompute the
behavioral probabilities that are consistent with equilibrium behavior under unanimity.
Fortunately, this is not difficult to do given our previous results. Given our estimates
{(pisti , θi)} we can use Eq. (4) with R to compute the equilibrium strategy cutpoints s∗∗i
consistent with unanimity rule. Given s∗∗, we can then compute γ∗∗i,1 = 1−Φ(θi[s∗∗i − 1])
and γ∗∗i,0 = 1−Φ(θis∗∗i ). Then the total probability of an incorrect ruling for the Supreme
Court under unanimity rule in the strategic voting model βU,stj is
βU,stj = ρj
[
1−
nj∏
i=1
(1− γ∗∗i,1)
]
+ (1− ρj)
[
nj∏
i=1
γ∗∗i,0
]
Table 5 shows the results per state, grouped as before by class of political institu-
tion. The results show that introducing the change to unanimity rule would have major
consequences to public outcomes and the effectiveness of the courts.
[Table 5 about here]
Consider first the expressive voting model. If justices care about their own vote
only, replacing majority rule by unanimity rule does achieve the purpose of reducing the
probability of an incorrect court decision in favor of the Plaintiff (column 4 in the table).
On the flip side, this is achieved by dramatically increasing the probability of an incorrect
court decision in favor of the Defendant (reaching 33% for elected justices, and 35% for
non-elected justices facing retention elections).
The strategic voting model also predicts large changes in outcomes as a result of the
change in the voting rule. Here, however, the changes occur in the opposite direction. As
a result of the move to unanimity, strategic justices who care about the decision of the
court would modify their strategy in equilibrium. And because the event of being pivotal
(all other nj − 1 members voting to rule in favor of the Plaintiff) here carries favorable
information for the Plaintiff, in equilibrium all justices become harsher against the De-
fendant (so as to tilt the equilibrium inference in favor of the Defendant; see Feddersen
and Pesendorfer (1998)). As a result, the move to unanimity significantly increases the
probability of a mistaken decision against the Defendant (reaching a maximum of 21%
for elected justices).
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6 Conclusion
What separates bureaucrats from politicians ? This fundamental question for represen-
tative democracy has three parts. First, do voters select a different type of public official
– more or less biased, better or worst at gathering and processing information –than
government officials? Second, do reelections induce public officials to improve their pro-
ficiency to deal with the flow of information of each decision? Do they induce them to be
more responsive to the public? Third, are bureaucrats more effective than politicians?
In order to answer these questions, we need to map institutions to the type of public
officials they induce. The difficulty, of course, is that this type is unobservable. The
contribution of this paper is to bridge this gap by specifying a decision-making model,
and using equilibrium information to recover the unobservable types. The main idea
is to exploit the information contained in the joint observation of the votes of mem-
bers of committees that deal with issues involving both ideological considerations and
common values. The underlying common value induces correlation in actions (votes) in
equilibrium, which allows us to disentangle bias and quality of information.
We focus on criminal decisions in US states’ Supreme Courts. The main results we
obtain clarify the trade-offs inherent in choosing between bureaucrats and politicians.
First, justices that are shielded from voters’ evaluations on average have higher quality
of information than justices that face either reelection or retention elections. In fact, the
information quality for justices that are shielded from voters’ influence (those appointed
for life and those appointed and reappointed by elected officials) is on average 25% larger
than that of justices facing retention elections, and 30% larger than that of justices
that are elected. Institutions of selection and retention of justices also affect justices’
bias (justices that are not shielded from voters are more moderate on average), but this
effect is more modest in magnitude. As a result, differences in information quality across
jurisdictions trump differences in bias, and justices who are shielded from voters not only
have better information, but are also more likely than elected justices to change their
preconceived opinions about a case, and have a better performance (lower probability of
making incorrect decisions) than elected justices.
Finally, we show that while the pattern of mistakes of state supreme courts is highly
asymmetric – with the courts making comparatively large mistakes in favor of the Plaintiff
– changing the voting rule to a rule more protective of the Defendant would produce
major consequences to public outcomes and the effectiveness of the courts. Thus any
such change should be considered with great care.
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Figure 1: Probability of an incorrect decision at the Court level. Type I and type II
errors.
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Table 4: Selection and Incentives
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Table 6: “Second-Stage” Estimates and Standard Errors for there sample courts: Cal-
ifornia, Connecticut and Texas (case-specific covariates fixed at state sample average;
individual justices evaluated at their own justice-specific covariates )
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Table 8: Justice-Specific Data
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